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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THb SNYDER MINES INCORPOR-
ATED, a corporation, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Department of Employ-
ment Security, 
Defendant 
Case No. 7310 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 9th day of January, 1941, a representative of the 
Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Com-
mission of -Utah entered a determination to the effect that 
certain lessees, under lease agreement with The Snyder Mines, 
Incorporated, had performed services (tin employment" for 
that company during the calendar years 1936, 1937, 1938 and 
1939 and that unemployment compensation contributions were 
due in the amount of $10,892.69 on the wages paid these men. 
The company disagreed with this determination, and on 
the 18th day of January, 1941, filed an appeal. The hearing 
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on appeal before the Appeal Tribunal was postponed by an 
agreement of the parties pending a decision in the Combined 
Metals and National Tunnel & Mines cases. 
On the 23rd day of February, 1943, a representative of 
the Department rendered an additional determination which 
held in effect that for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942 the 
company had failed to pay contributions on wages received 
by lessees, truckers and Mr. E. H. Snyder, President of the 
company, and that the services of these individuals were 
performed ccin employment" with the company. The company 
disagreed with this determination, and on the 2nd day of 
March, 1943, filed an appeal. 
Both appeals were heard by the Appeal Referee on the 
dates of June 15, July 13 and August 12 (circumstances having 
necessitated continuances). The Appeals Referee, .on the 
19th day of August, 1943, rendered his decision affirming the 
determination of the Department representative. 
On the 27th day of August, 1943, The Snyder Mines, 
Incorporated filed an appeal from the decision of the Referee 
and asked for a hearing on the said appeal before the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah as provided by law. The Com-
mission took no action on the company's request for further 
hearing· on appeal until November 22, 1948, at which time 
they notified the company that· a hearing would be held on 
November 29 in the Governor's Board Room of the State 
Capitol Building. On the 1st day of March, 1949, the Indus-
trial Commission affirmed the decision of the Referee and 
thereby in effect affirmed the decision of the representative. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. 
Lessees 
The lessees in question performed servtces pursuant to 
written lease agreements which were similar in all material 
respects to the agreements invoJved in the case of Combined 
Metals Reduction Company, et al vs. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 101 Utah 230: 116 Pac. 2d 929 and National Tunnel 
& Mines Corporation vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 99 
Utah 39: 102 Pac. 2d 514. 
As indicated by the petitioner on page 3 and 4 of its 
brief, the question regarding lessees is not as to whether or 
not the lessees were performing services (tin employment" but 
rather, ''the question remains whether the Commission exceeded 
its jurisdiction, -acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or proceded 
improperly against petitioner." 
II. 
. Services of E. H. Snyder 
E. H. Snyder vvas president of The Snyder Mines, Incor-
porated during the period in question, and he performed 
services of a professional nature for a regular monthly salary. 
As indicated in the testimony, which is summarized on page 
6 and 7 of the petitioner's brief, E. H. Snyder was Vice Presi-
dent and General Manager of Combined Metals Reduction 
Company as well as the President of The Snyder Mines In"" 
corporated. His superior knu~.vledge of metallurgical con-
ditions was used by the latter company in making decisions 
regarding ore trends in the mtne. 
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III. 
Truckers 
The company engaged several individuals to operate com-
pany-owned trucks, and in addition, from time to time it made 
arrangements with men in the district who owned their own 
trucks to haul ore and waste for the company. Those men 
were paid either by the ton hauled or in certain instances by 
the hours that they and their trucks were retained. They worked 
only during the hours that the company-operated shovels were 
working, and to quote a letter from the company: ((These 
trucks must dispose of ore or waste in whatever manner we 
direct." In the main the truckers engaged were formerly em-
ployed by the Bothv1ell Company, and the hauling was done 
primarily on the Snyder Mines property. The effective rate 
was $.25per ton hauled and the men were paid twice a month 
on the regular settling-up days. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGl)MENT 
I. 
THE LESSEES, TRUCKERS, AND E. H. SNYDER 
WERE PERFORMING SERVICES IN EMPLOYMENT FOR 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR WAGES. 
Section 42-2a-19(j) (1) and 19(j) (5) (Utah Employment 
Security Act) contain definitions of employment as follows: 
(( (j) ( 1) (Employment' means any service performed 
prior to January 1, 1941, which was employment as de-
fined in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Lav.' 
6; 
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prior to the effective date of this act, and subject to the 
other provisions of this sub-section, service performed 
after December 31, 1940, including service in inter-
state commerce, and service as an officer of a corpora-
tion performed for wages or under any contract of hire, 
v1ritten or oral, express or implied." 
u (j) ( 5) Services performed by an individual for 
vtages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, 
express or in1plied, shall be deemed to be employtnent 
subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the Commission that-
tc (A) such individual has been and will continue to 
be free from control or direction over the performance 
of such services, both under his contract of hire and 
in fact; and 
tt (B) such service is either outside the usual course 
of the busines for which such·- service is performed or 
that such service is performed outside of all the places 
of business of ·the enterprise for \vhich such service 
is performed; and 
tc (C) such individual is customarily engaged .11 an in-
dependently established trade, occupation, profession, 
or business of the same nature as that involved in the 
contract of service.'' 
Section 42-2a-19(h) (2) of the Utah Employment Se-
<.u rity Act provides: 
tc ( 2) Each individual employed to perf orr:(} or to 
assist in performing the work of any person in the 
service of an employing unit shall be deen1ed to be 
engaged by such employing unit for all the purposes 
of this act whether such individual was hired or oaid 
l 
directly by such employing unit or by such person, 
provided the employing unit had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the work." 
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In several cases decided by this court prior to 1943 this 
court upheld the theory that the aforementioned provision was 
intended to be broader in scope than the common law test of 
master and servant. In the case of Singer Sewing Machine Com-
pany vs. Industrial Commission, et al, 104 Utah 175; 134 P. 2nd 
479, decided in 1943, this court set out in detail the principles 
and application of the above-quoted section as the court saw 
it, and we quote: 
c CThe examination of these optntons reveals that the 
members of this court are committed to the following: 
(C (a) The unemployment compensation law was en-
acted under and as an exercise of the police power of 
the state. 
(C (b) Its purpose is remedial to protect the health, 
morals, and welfare of the people by providing a cushion 
against the shocks and rigors of unemployment. 
c t (c) Being remedial under the police power and not 
imposing limitations on basic rights, it should be liber-
ally construed. 
(C (d) (Employment' under the act is- not contned to 
common law concepts, or to the relationship of master 
and servant, but is expanded to embrace all services 
rendered for another for wages. 
(C (e) The terms (employment,' (personal services' and 
(wages' are much broader in meaning and application 
than their common law counterparts, and encompass in 
their coverage many persons and relationships not in-
cluded in the common law relationship of master and 
servant. 
u (f) All situations where one rendering services for 
another for (wages' is under the direction and control of 
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such other in the rendering of such service, are service 
relationships within Sec. 19 (j) ( 1) of the act. 
H (g) The absence of direction and control does not 
necessarily exclude the parties, or the relationship from 
the operations or scope of the act. 
"(h) In determining if the relationship is within the 
act, the Commission and the court will look behind the 
contract to the actual situation-the status in vvhich 
the parties are placed by the relationship that exists 
between them. 
tt ( i) The test is twofold: Did he render personal ser-
vice for another? If so, was he entitled to remuneration 
(wages) therefor? If both are found, the relationship 
is within the act. 
u (j) If the relationship is within the act, we J.pply 
Section 19(j) (5) to determine if he is entitled to 
benefits, provided the claimant meets all other require-
ments of the act to bring him within its provisions. 
t c ( k) Section 19 ( j ) ( 5) is an exception section taking 
or sifting out from the right to receive benefits, certain 
persons who otherwise corp.e within the act, as cren-
dering personal services for wages' and is not a test 
to determine whether the relationship v;:as a service 
one.'' 
Under this summary, then, we are confronted with a two-
fold problem: ( 1) Were the individuals in question perform-
ing ccpersonal services" for ccwages" for the plaintiff; and ( 2) 
if the relationship was one of the performance of personal 
services for wages, has the employer satisfied all three of the 
exclusion tests which are provided in Section 19 (j) ( 5) (a), 
(b) & (c). 
(A) In the first paragraph as regards the question of 
whether or not the lessees were performing services ccin em-· 
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ployment" for ((wages," the matter seems to be settled by the 
stipulation entered into between counsel for the parties which 
stipulation and the legal effect thereof is referred to on pages 
3 and 4 of the petitioner's brief. This court's decisions in the 
cases of National Tunnel & Mines .Corp. vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 99 Utah 39:102 Pac. 2d 514, and Combined Metals 
Reduction Co. et al vs. Industrial Commission, 101 Utah, 230; 
116 Pac. 2d 929, found that ((lessees" such as are involved 
herein were performing services ((in employment" for ((wages." 
(B) Concerning the question as to whether or not the 
truckers were performing services under the service relationship 
as defined, there appears to be little doubt these individuals 
were performing services for the company for wages pursuant 
to an oral agreement whereby they agreed to use their own 
trucks and to haul ore and waste on a per-tonnage basis. The 
record shows that the matter of their performance was fully 
explored by the Appeal Referee, with the company having full 
opportunity to present facts concerning the matter at issue. 
There is no proof by the company that in the performance of 
services these individuals could be shown to come within the 
exclusion provisions of Section 19 (j) ( 5). To the contrary, 
they were employed for an indefinite period of time and the 
employment could be terminated at any time by the company. 
All of their services were performed under the express direc-
tion of -other company employees as to the point from which 
the ore was to be hauled, when it was to be hauled, and where 
it was to be dumped or unloaded. The ore hauling was a 
necessary integrated part of the company's mining operation 
and was done primarily on the company's premises. The in-
10 
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dividuals engaged in the hauling were, for the most part, 
former employees of a trucking company and were not in any 
sense of the word according to the testimony independently 
established in a business of the same nature as was involved 
m their performance of services for The Snyder Mines. 
Since the decision of the Industrial Commission is fully 
supported by facts, it becomes the duty of this court to deter-
mine whether or not the Commission has made a proper 
application of the law. We submit that the conclusion of the 
Commission is the only one which could have been made in 
light of the facts. 
(C) In view of the previous decisions of this court and 
the well settled formula of the law, we fail to see wherein the 
company has made a case for the exclusion of the ~ervices of 
E. H. Snyder. The testimony and the record shows that 
Snyder's time was fully occupied in his services as Vice President 
and Manager of the Combined Metals Reduction Company 
and his technical services which were performed for the Snyder 
Mines. The testimony of Neil Snyder, Manager of The Snyder 
Mines, Incorporated, and the record shows that E. H. Snyder's 
services were paid for by means of a regular monthly salary. He 
was performing services in a service relationship for wages even 
though such services were confined primarily to the giving 
of technical advice with reference to the interpretation of 
general ore trends in the mine operation. The company ~on­
tends that his technical services were given pursuant to an estab-
lished profession as metallurgist and were made possible by 
his superior knowledge of mining operations. We submit 
that this very fact formed the basis for the company's use 
11 
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of his services. There has been no showing by the company 
that he was independently established in a profession. No-
where does the testimony indicate that E. H. Snyder held 
himself out to the general public as a professional man. In 
fact the record shows that he did not perform similar services 
for companies other than Combined Metals Reduction Company 
and the Snyder Mines. The Commission correctly concluded 
that Snyder was performing services pursuant to a service 
relationship for wages (by means of a monthly salary) and 
that the exclusion provisions of Section 19(j) {5) ·had not 
been met. 
II. 
THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT CONFERRING 
JURISDICTION ON THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
TO ASSESS AND COLLECT UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATON CONTRIBUTIONS DID NOT VIOLATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
The petitioner argues that the Employment Security Act 
is in violation of Article 13, Section 11 of the Utah constitution 
which provides in part: ((The State Tax Commission shall 
administer and supervise the tax laws of the state." 
This court in its decision in the case of Singer Sewing 
Machine Company vs. Industrial Commission, supra, stated, 
referring to previous opinions regarding the Employment Se-
curity Act: t (The examination of these opinions reveals that 
the members of this court are committed to the following: 
(a) The unemployment compensation law was enacted under, 
12 
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and as an exercise of the police power of t~e state; (b) its 
purpose is remedial to protect the health, morals, and welfare 
of the people by providing a cushion against the shocks and 
rigors of unemployment; (c) being remedial under the police 
power and not imposing limitations on basic rights, it should 
be liberally construed.'' 
It is of importance to observe that Article 13, Section 11 
of the Utah constitution refers to ((tax laws." Thus, the con-
stitution does not purport to give exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Tax Commission with respect to the administering and super-
vision of all laws involving compulsory payment. The constitu-
tion avoids the ambiguity. inherent in the use of the common 
word ((taxes" and conveys the impression that the Tax Commis-
sion's jurisdiction is limited to lavvs which are imposed exclusive-
ly by virtue of the taxing power of the state.· This is clearly 
evidenced by the legislative expression of this provision of 
the state constitution. For example, the monies paid by em-
ployers into the State Insur~nce Fund under the Workmen's 
Compensation law (a law which is predicated on the exercise 
of the police povver of the state, Utah Fuel Company vs. In-
dustrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, 124), are not 
collected _or administered by the State Tax Commission. 
Similarly, under the Fish and Game laws the Fish and Game 
Commissioner collects fees and license monies and determines 
liability independently of the Tax Commission. These fees 
and monies are deposited by th~ Commission in a special fund 
which is administered by him separately and apart from the 
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The Department of Registration likewise collects monies 
and determines issues of liability with respect to many matters 
entrusted by the legislature to it for supervision, administration 
and control. . 
The line which distinguishes an exerctse of the police 
power from an exercise of the taxing power is difficult to 
draw, but notwithstanding these difficulties, there are criteria 
available for determining whether a general statute falls on 
one side of the line or the other. 
- There is no validity to the argument that the Utah En1-
ployment Security Act is a ccrevenue act" or that revenue is 
the primary purpose of the law and that regulation which is 
inherent in the police power of the state is merely incidental. 
The Act provides for an unemployment compensation fund 
ccwhich shall be administered separate and apart from all 
public monies or funds of the state," and which is to be ad-
ministered by the State Treasurer not in his regular capacity 
but ((as ex-officio treasurer and custodian." The fund consists 
of all contributions collected under the Act, and the Industrial 
Commission is vested with full power authority and jurisdiction 
over the fund. Contributions collected are deposited in the 
Federal Unemployment Trust Fund and are requisitioned 
therefrom by the Industrial Commission (through the treasurer 
acting as its fiscal agent) from time to time in such amounts 
as it deems necessary for anticipated benefit payments. When 
requisitioned, such monies are required to be deposited in the 
unemployment compensation fund in a special benefit account, 
and benefits are to be paid therefrom in accordance with such 
14 
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regulations as the Industrial Commission rna y prescribe. The 
monies may be used only to pay benefits. 
It is apparent that the system of collection and the pay-
ment of benefits contemplated by the legislature differs 
fundamentally and radically from that set up by statute for 
the collection of general taxes. It is significant that the con-
tributions collected never become a part of, nor are they ever 
mingled with the public funds of the State or its Treasury, 
which are avail~ble for defraying the general expenses of 
government. The legislature had in min~ the integrated 
nature of the whole unemployment program when it designated 
the Industrial Commission as the agency which would be 
charged with the duty of collecting contributions. 
The individual worker, when filing a claim for benefits, 
depends for his eligibility and duration upon the earnings 
which he has had from covered employers, which earnings have 
been reported to the Industrial Commission, and contributions 
paid thereon. If he has· no earnings or has insufficient earnings 
from employers who are subject to _the Act, he, of course, does 
not fall in that class of individuals who are entitled to the 
protection of the Act. It is logical to assume that there may be 
proper and efficient administration only when the power to 
determine the eligibility of the claimant and the contribution 
due from the employer (as a result of the employer having 
individuals in covered employtJ1ent) is given to a single ad-
ministrative agency or department. 
As Justice Wolfe pointed out in his concurring opinion 
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C<I think that when the fact of ·employment' is found 
for the purpose of determining benefits, it is meant to 
be binding as to the question of determination of ·con-
tributions' . . .'' 
He further stated: 
C<If the Industrial Commission may be sure that the 
appeal to this court from its findings as to that appli-
. cant will set the question at rest, it will be guided by 
the decision in said appeal in determining the question 
of benefits for the entire class. There is some chance, 
at least, to obtain in such proceedings a decision of 
this court before the Fund is depleted by many payments 
to alleged employees whose alleged employers need 
not contribute.'' 
Justice Wolfe pointed out in his opinion: 
··where one of two constructions of the law would 
render an act unworkable or only haltingly workable, 
or would fail to effectuate the obvious intent of the 
legislature and another contribution equally or nearly 
as feasible would bring opposite results, it is our duty 
to adopt the latter. I see nothing in logic or precedent 
that requires us to accept the construction of the tnain 
opinion. This is a case in which we are dealing ·with 
the administration of a public act designed to benefit 
a class and society as a whole by cushioning the effect 
of unemployment. It is not the case of a private con-
troversy involving only the rights of A against B." 
See also The Best Foods Co. vs. Christensen, 75 Utah 
392, 285 P. 1001, 1004, and particularly, the cases cited at that 
page. See also State vs. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 297 P. 
1013; Utah· State Fair Association vs. Green, 68 Utah 251, 
249 P. 1016; Wadsworth vs. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 
28 P. (2d) 161, 167; Tintic Standard Mining Co. vs. Utah 
16 
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County, 80 Utah 491, 16 P. (2d) 637; Salter vs. Nelson, 85 
Utah 460, 39 P. (2d) 1061; 25 R.C.L., p. 100, et seq., sections 
243, 244, 245. 
It was further stated in that opinion: 
((Certainly there is a distinction between (contributions' 
to a fund which is designed for the welfare of a class 
and a tax for general purposes although both are 
(exactions,' and even though the effect of both is the 
same on the tax payer. It i~ important to keep our 
nomenclature correct, but more important that our con-
cepts not be confused. It J;Ilay well be that the type 
. of contribution which is exacted for the unemployment 
insurance fund is not a ttax' in the sense that that term 
was used in the constitutional provision which gave 
the T-ax Commission administration and supervision 
of tax laws. Certainly the contributions may be looked 
at as payments into a fund for- specific purposes-the 
whole encompassed by the police power even though 
not regulatory . . . · 
ttl see no essential difference between a required con-
tribution toward an unemployment insurance fund 
and a required payment of a percentage of a pay roll 
into a compulsory state insurance fund for disability 
compensation as is done in Ohio ... 
((The unemployment compensation act sets up a plan 
which places on the employing class the duty of bearing 
one of the burdens which the law in its march now 
considers one of the hazards of industry, to wit: 
unemployment. Disability by accident in industry has 
long been considered one of the incidents which industry 
must be prepared to meet. Unemployment may be 
considered in the same light although in it the relation 
of cause and effect is not so clear as in cases of disability 
through accident which occurred during employment 
Industry may be thought of as responsible for an indi-
17 
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vidual's unemployment in the sense that such unem-
ployment is caused by industry's failure ·to absorb 
him ... 
''Unemployment is considered a responsibility of in-
dustry. Hence, industry is required to contribute to 
a fund to relieve it. The whole scheme of unemploy-
ment compensation, including the raising of a· fund, 
may be considered as an integrated whole, all of which 
falls under police power, since only that class which 
is employed benefits and only industry, upon v1hom 
society puts the direct responsibility, contributes to 
alleviate this condition of unemployment of its workers. 
In that sense the plan is a unit, an integrated whole, 
a self-contained scheme under the police power. If 
the general public, regardless of the employer-employee 
relationship were taxed, the situation might be differ-
ent. The difference in the last analysis may be one in 
degree between the relation of the unemployed and 
industry and the relation of the unemployed and the 
public ... " 
While the decision in the National Tunnel & Mines case, 
supra, did not decide the question as to whether or not the 
Industrial Commission might constitutionally determine who 
was subject to the payment of unemployment compensation 
contributions, we think that the excerpts hereinabove set forth 
from Justice Wolfe's concurring opinion outline the real basis 
of the matter at issue in the instant case and clearly show 
that the contribution which is levied under the Employment 
Security Act is not a tax in the sense of the word as used in 
the constitution. The legislative intent is further evidenced 
by the fact t~at reduced rates of contribution are based upon 
the length of time the employer has been in business and upon 
the stability of his pay rolls. The theory which is evidenced, 
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of course, is that the employer who has a relatively stable pay 
roll from quarter to quarter and year to year has offered 
workers a steady means of income and has not increased the 
total unemployment load in the state. The ·employer who 
is qualified for a reduced rate may pay ·.as low as . 7 of. one 
per cent while the employer who is not so qualified is com-
pelled to pay 2. 7 per cent into the unemployment compensation 
fund. 
We submit that unemployment compensation contributions 
are not ((taxes" within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision. We submit further that it is a well settled principle 
of law that an individual who attacks the constitutionality 
of a statute must_ show beyond question that the statu_te in its 
operation injures him. -This principle has -b~en stated by 
this honorable- court in- the cases ot Ex reL Johnson vs. Alex-
ander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. (2d) 408; and, State vs. Hoffman, 
64 P. (2d) 615. See also, Jeffrey Manufacturing Co., vs. 
Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, at 575, 576; Gorieb vs. Fox, 274 U. S. 
603, 606; Stein vs. Kentucky State Tax Commission, 266 Ky. 
469, 99 S. W. (2d) · 443;· Bourjois vs. Chapman, 301 U. S. 
183. We fail to see how the company is in any way injuriously 
affected by the order of the Commission requiring it to pay 
contributions on the earnings of the individuals in question, 
since this court has previously, in numerous cases, held that 
the intent of the Act was to cover such services as are here 
involved. 
It is of interest to note that during the period commencing 
July 1, 1941 (when the Employment Security Act was changed 
to place the responsibility of making collections directly_ on 
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the Industrial Commission) and ending August 31, 1949, the 
Commission and its representatives have collected for the 
unemployment compensation fund $38,438,000. During this 
same period, the Cemmission has dispersed through benefits 
to eligible claimants $15,166,027. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the individuals, 
including lessees, truckers, and E. H. Snyder, involved in 
this matter were performing services in employment for the 
plaintiff for wages, and we further- submit that the Employment 
Security Act, conferring jurisdiction on the Industrial Com-
mission to assess and collect unemployment compensation 
contributions, did not violate constitutional provisions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assistant Attorney Gene1'al 
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